Testifying before the Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service, Transocean employee Douglas Brown, chief mate on the Deepwater Horizon rig, describes the explosions on the rig, damage to its bridge, the crew’s failed firefighting efforts and final evacuation via lifeboats.
The Coast Guard’s transcript of Brown’s testimony and questioning follows. Particularly compelling are the investigators’ attempts to discern the extent to which BP employees, under pressure to cut corners on the rig, overruled the Transocean crew’s decisions and concerns.
How long had you been a chief mechanic
onboard the Transocean Deepwater Horizon?
Since it was first built, in 2000.
So you’ve been on the Deepwater Horizon
since it entered the Gulf of Mexico?
Yes.
Can you briefly describe your job
responsibilities as a chief mechanic?
Basically repairing, fixing, and
maintaining most of its equipment.
Equipment such as, can you tell us what
type of equipment?
Let’s see. Engines, thrusters, potable
water systems, pneumatic systems, fuel
systems, lubrication systems, sea water,
potable water.
Prior to working with Transocean, did
you have any previous experience with any type
of company or drilling contractor?
No.
So you’ve solely been Transocean
throughout the duration of your career?
Well, actually, I started out with R&B
Falcon, which was bought out by Transocean.
Prior to the incident, how long had you
been on your hitch?
I would say I came on tour at noon, and
the incident happened somewhere after 9:45
p.m.
When arriving that Friday, were you
made aware of any type of issues onboard the
Deepwater Horizon while at that location?
No, I was not.
To your knowledge, does the Deepwater
Horizon have a close-captioned television
system where you can monitor certain things on
the rig?
Yes, it does.
Do you know if that information is
transmitted real time to the beach?
No, I do not know.
At this time, can you give us a
synopsis of what actually took place the day
of the incident and up to the incident and
after the incident onboard the Horizon?
At eleven o’clock there is a pre-tour
meeting, which basically is to go over what’s
going to be taking place for today on the rig
and on the drill floor. I really don’t follow
too strenuously what they discuss that’s going
to be happening on the drill floor, because
it’s not part of my department, but I recall a
scrimmage taking place between the company
man, the OIM, and the toolpusher and driller
concerning the events of the day.
The driller was outlining what was
going to be taking place, where upon the
company man stood up and said, “No, we have
some changes to that.” I really didn’t pay
attention to what he was saying, but it had to
do with displacing the riser for later on that
tour. And the OIM and the driller and
toolpusher had a disagreement with that.
There was, I remember there was a
slight argument that took place in a
difference of opinion, and the company man was
basically saying, “Well, this is how it’s
going to be.” And the toolpusher and the OIM
reluctantly agreed.
Okay. After that incident had taken
place, can you tell me what happened? And I
assume you went directly to the engine control
room or something?
Yes.
Can you please tell me what you were
doing after that transpired?
After that I went about my normal
duties, which is to make engine room and
thruster rounds, and after following that we
started our daily work, which for that day was
to repair a saltwater pipe down in one of the
pontoons. We finished replacing that
saltwater pipe towards the late evening, I
would say around 9:15, where upon we returned
to the engine control room.
Part of my duties is to fill out the
nightly log and equipment hours, where upon I
sat down at the computer and started to do
that. Somewhere before 10:00 we heard a loud,
very extremely loud air leak sound. It didn’t
quite sound like a normal air leak to me. It
sounded almost like they were venting the
riser tensioners, but it actually didn’t sound
the same as that.
Upon that, and wondering what was going
on, we started hearing gas alarms going off.
And gas alarms just kept piling up on top of
each other more and more and more. Over the
radio I heard the captain or chief mate, I’m
not sure who, make an announcement to the
standby boat, the BANKSTON, saying that we
were in a well control situation.
And right upon that the engines RPM
started increasing. I heard them revving up
higher and higher and higher. Next I was
expecting the engine trips to take over, such
as the overspeed, and that did not happen.
After that the power went out and I was
assuming that was our high-frequency trip and
we were put in dark, and right on the end of
that was the first explosion.
And the first explosion basically threw
me up against the control panel, that I was
standing in front of, and a hole opened up
underneath me and I fell down into the hole,
into the subfloor where all the cable trays
and wires are located at. I was wondering
what was happening. I was confused. I was
hurting. I was dazed, and I proceeded to try
to get up and the second explosion happened.
And I ended up falling back down in the hole
and the ceiling caved in on top of me at this
point.
After that I was wondering if there was
going to be more explosions and I started
hearing people screaming and calling for help,
that they were hurt, they needed to get out of
here. So I proceeded to crawl out of the hole
and looked around, and Mike Williams, a ET who
was in the next room to us, was crawling over
the rubble next to me, and he was heading
towards the open hatch door into the — aft of
the engine control room, which had been blown
open and bent.
He started heading that way, and I
proceeded to follow him. And I, him, and one
of my motorman were out on the back deck. One
of the other motorman who was still inside
called that he had found one of our other
engineers in there and that he was hurt.
So my other motorman proceeded to go
back in to help him with that, and I proceeded
to go with the ET, Mike Williams, to the
bridge, ’cause he was dazed, confused, he was
screaming he had to get out of here, and he
had a wound on his forehead and he was
bleeding profusely. We proceeded to go up to
the main deck, where we saw the derrick on
fire.
We proceeded then to go along the port
side, pass the port crane, up to the bridge.
Upon entering the bridge, it was complete
chaos. They were trying to get systems going,
they were trying to get control back, and I
asked the captain, “We’re here, Mike Williams
has an injury.” So he told us to go to the
lifeboats and find the medic.
We proceeded to the lifeboats,
whereupon I lost track of Mike. And so I went
to my lifeboat that I was stationed to go to.
And we waited around outside the lifeboat,
waiting to receive orders. And it was just
complete mayhem, chaos, people were scared,
they were crying. I heard later that some
were jumping overboard.
Finally the order was given to board
and man the lifeboats, so we entered the
lifeboats, where upon we sat for a while
longer, many minutes, waiting to see what was
going to happen. More people showed up and
got in the lifeboats. An injured person was
brought into the lifeboat on a stretcher. And
after that the word was given to abandon ship.
Our lifeboat was lowered, and we disconnected
from the cabling and went to the Bankston, to
where we boarded the Bankston.
And about this time I started realizing
that I was starting to hurt and feel pain.
And so I was taken to a bench and sat down,
and I was helped by some medical personnel,
whereupon later I was airlifted off the
Bankston once the Coast Guard showed up and
taken to another drilling rig that was there,
that they had set up to be like a triage. And
from there I was medivaced to Mobile, Alabama,
where I was in the hospital.
Let me back up to the engine room prior
to the explosion. Obviously, you said you’ve
been on that rig since it entered the Gulf of
Mexico. Would you say you’re very familiar
with the layout of the engine control room?
Yes.
Can you please give me your best
assessment on what happened in the engine
room, what engine maybe revved up first, or if
they revved up in conjunction with each other,
what engine you thought possibly could have
revved up first?
I’m going to say both of them revved up
at the same time, and we had engines 3 and 6
on line at the time. And in my opinion, I’m
going to say that Engine 3 most likely blew
up, simply because the explosion came from the
port side, which Engine 3 was pretty much
located right next to the engine control room
down one level. And I really can’t say which
one revved up first, ’cause to me it sounded
like both of them did.
Were there any engines that were
nonoperational at that time?
Yes. One, two, four and five were not
in operation.
So the only options remaining were
three, four and six?
No, four was not running.
So three, five, and six. Sorry.
Three and six were running.
Were there any safety devices to
prevent engine overspeed on those pieces of
equipment?
Yes, there were.
Which types?
There was a mechanical overspeed and
then an electrical overspeed.
Can you elaborate on how those safety
devices are set to prevent engine overspeed?
The engine normally runs at about 720
RPMs. And the engine overspeed for the
mechanical, it basically operates about 15
percent higher than that, somewhere around 800
RPMs, or just over that. And once the engine
RPMs achieves that set rating, it will trip
the engine and basically shut it down,
shutting down the fuel going to it and
shutting down the airflow to it.
I’d like to show you an exhibit if we
could put it up of the main deck. But while
that’s being done, did those safety devices
work?
I do not think so, no.
In the engine control room, are you
aware of any gas alarm system that may also
shunt power to the engine control room?
No.
So there is not?
There is none.
Okay. While they’re setting that up,
is there any type of safety device on the air
intake system that will prevent gas to flow
into the engine control room?
There are the rig savers. They are
just after the turbo intakes, in between the,
what we call the “charge air box.”
And that prevents flow from the —
Yes.
In your opinion, did those function
properly?
No.
Do you know if any of the safety
devices that we’ve just gone over were
inspected?
We test those on a, I think it is a
yearly basis. And I believe they were tested
back in January or February and they had
functioned fine.
I don’t know if you can see it, but are
you familiar with where the engine control
room is in relation to the air intake near the
rig floor?
Yes.
Can you please point out the air intake
that — or mark up on the board with this red
pen?
(Witness marking.)
Please mark where the engine air intake
is?
Number 3 is going to be right about
here, and Number 6 is right over here
(indicating and marking).
Okay. Thank you. So in relation to
where you just indicated, can you please
explain how close relatively in feet the air
intake is to the rig floor?
Number 3 would be pretty much within
15 feet, 20 feet of the rig floor. Number 6
is off to the starboard side a little more,
but I would say that one would be about 25, 30
feet from the starboard corner of the rig
floor.
So the air intake nearest the rig floor
that is the air intake for the No. 3 engine in
your opinion failed, and then the safety
devices on the No. 3 engine later failed as
well once overspeed began?
Yes.
And we talked about the inspection.
Does Transocean inspect those periodically?
Is it documented on who does those?
Yes, it is.
And how often is that inspected?
I believe it’s a yearly. There might
even be a 2000 hour PM in there that has some
of them checked, but not all of them.
Have you ever seen anybody outside of
Transocean inspect any of those devices?
Yes.
And who would that be?
I believe ABS and ABB, and I believe
the Coast Guard during some Coast Guard
inspection checking.
Was there a maintenance plan on those
devices held by Transocean?
Yes.
Who is responsible for making sure that
those devices were maintained?
The entire engine department, from
motormen on up.
And how many people worked in the motor
department at the time of the incident?
On tour at that time was first
engineer, myself, and two motormen.
And how many onboard the rig total —
Total?
— that operated it?
That operated the —
That switched tours.
There were seven.
In your history of being on the
Deepwater Horizon since 2000, 2001, has that
number changed?
Yes.
Has it decreased? increased? Can you
please elaborate on that?
When we first left Korea, we had a full
time — a chief engineer, a first engineer, 2
second engineers, 2 third engineers, and 4
motormen, cut that in half for each tour,
basically. Around 2003 or so, that number
changed. First they removed a motormen, a
third engineer, and then nine months later
they eliminated the first engineer, and a
mechanical supervisor was placed in that
position, to watch over not only the drill
floor equipment, but the engine room too.
And had it changed since 2003 to the
present date?
Yes. In about, I would say about a
year and a half ago it finally, we finally
were — heard that it was going to be
upgraded, and I would say about nine months
ago a first engineer was placed in action
again, back in the engine room, but only on
one tour.
Had it ever been communicated to you
why there was a reduction from 2001 to 2003?
No, that was really not told to me.
Had your job become more overwhelming
on people who were responsible for all the
equipment in the engine control room with that
reduction?
Yes, it was.
Let me back up a little bit again.
Earlier in your testimony you had said you
heard communication with someone to the DAMON
Bankston in regards to they were having a well
control incident, correct?
Yes.
So obviously there was some line of
communication that you heard from someone in
charge on that vessel to the engine control
room?
I heard it over the radio, but it
wasn’t directed at me.
Okay. So there is a radio in your
possession where you can be given directions
if need be?
Yes.
Is there an emergency shutdown system
in the engine control room that you operated
in?
Yes.
Were you given any direction from
anyone on that rig to shut down the engines?
No, I was not.
Could you please give me your best
opinion on what would have happened if you
shut down those systems, the engine systems?
If I were to shut down those engines,
it could have stopped as an ignition source.
Do you not have the direct authority
yourself to activate the emergency shutdown
system in the —
No, I do not.
Who gives you that authority, or who
directs you to do that?
That really has never been discussed.
I’ve never read any proper procedure. So
under an assumption, I would say the captain
or OIM.
In the almost ten years you were on the
Deepwater Horizon, did you ever in a well
control incident shut down the system and
standby, or any type of procedures that might
have been happening without any written
documented procedures?
No.
Backing up to the air intake system.
If a sudden influx of gas was to come from the
well near, I think you said fifteen feet near
the air intake, which obviously you think it
didn’t work, what would happen in an engine
that is in a runaway mode?
In my opinion it would do exactly what
it did, it would increase the engine speed.
It would just give it a more volatile form of
burning mixture.
So is it true that I can say that the
failure to prevent gas intake into the engine
control room to prevent overspeed would have
prevented the explosion?
Yes.
Have there been any operational changes
on the Deepwater Horizon since you’ve been on
that rig?
Can you define that a little more?
Operational in the fact that certain
personnel have certain stay-overs — certain
procedures on that rig, who’s in charge of
giving the orders. We saw a flow chart
earlier, that the OIM was responsible. Has
there been any operational changes on who
makes the shots and who makes the calls on the
rig?
Not that I’m really aware of.
E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. DYKES:
Mr. Brown, just for clarification for
my benefit. The air intakes for the engine
rooms, those are intakes for the engine rooms
only, correct, they’re not directly fed to
the, directly to the engine; is that correct?
Yes, they feed the air to the engine
room itself.
And then the engines themselves are
natural draft engines, with turbos?
Yes, they receive their air from the
air that’s in the engine room.
E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. McCARROLL:
You said the people responsible for
inspecting these emergency devices is ABS,
ADD; is that what you said?
ABB.
AP?
ABB, Bravo, Bravo.
And the U.S. Coast Guard?
Yes.
During your time on the rig, did anyone
at any time express to you that these devices
were not working correctly?
I do recall there were some times where
we had some, like oil low pressure switches
that were not functioning properly. And in
2008, Number 3 engine, we did have a governor
failure.
And how was that discovered?
Engine overspeed. The governor
basically broke and lost its control over the
engine, so the engine ran away.
But none of these were found during an
inspection?
No.
E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. DYKES:
When you’re testing these devices on
these engine shutdowns, is it an actually
shutdown of the engine or is there a test
function for these shutdown devises?
It’s a natural shutdown.
It’s a natural shutdown, okay.
E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. WHEATLEY:
Good morning, Mr. Brown. Excuse me. I
have a few questions for you on a slightly
different topic here that the Board is
interested in covering and this is related to
basically the human factors in your perception
of the events.
In the 48 hour period immediately
preceding the incident, could you give us an
estimate how much sleep you had had?
I did not have any sleep from the time
that I woke up that day to go on tour till
about a couple days later. I believe I was up
40 hours.
And is that normal for you, or —
No, not even close to being normal for
me.
What was unusual about the
circumstances?
MR. KOHNKE:
Excuse me. Can we get a timeframe?
BY MR. WHEATLEY:
When you mentioned you hadn’t slept in
40 hours, what I’m referring to is, if we
start at the time of the incident, in the 48
hours prior to that, not what happened after.
Uh-huh (affirmative response). Oh, on
a normal basis, I’m on a 12 hour on and off
cycle.
Okay. And if you could, for the two
days preceding the event, how much sleep did
you get?
Seven — seven, eight hours a day.
Is that pretty much normal for you?
Yes.
Thank you. And again, please bear with
me here. Would you have any type of physical
conditions prior to the incident which
required you to take medication?
I had high blood pressure, so I took
blood pressure medication.
Thank you, sir. And in the period
leading up there, did you feel like you were
under any type of unusual stress or personal
issues that were affecting you at the time?
No.
Thank you. Would it be fair to say
that you were provided with all the necessary
personal protective equipment that you needed
to perform your job such as gloves, hard hats,
safety glasses, steel-toed boots?
Yes.
Prior to the event, were you aware of
any type of concerns or pressures from either
Transocean or BP personnel concerning
completion of this particular drilling
project?
Yes.
What were those, please?
I didn’t really hear anything verbal,
but it was just passed around via other people
that this well was taking too long and they
were in a hurry to complete it, so they can
move on to the next.
Could you be any more specific about
the information you received and where it came
from?
No, I cannot.
Preceding the incident, were you aware
of the fact that there were senior Transocean
and BP personnel management onboard the
Deepwater Horizon?
Yes, I had heard some BP
representatives had come aboard that day.
Were you aware of what their purpose
for the visit was?
Basically, yes, to congratulate the
crew on a good safety record, ’cause we had
just completed seven years no loss times
incidents or anything.
And did you have any direct interaction
with those personnel?
No, I did not.
I’d like to go and — because this has
been raised any previous testimony, about the
lifesaving and fire fighting training and
processes on board the vessel.
Were you familiar with your watch board
and station bill?
Yes.
And what position did you hold?
I was holding a second assistant
position, and I basically was on the tech
team, and we met in the engine control room
during any type of emergency. Such as a fire,
we would all meet back there and then assist
as directed.
Okay. During the time you were on the
Horizon, did you participate in emergency
training drills such as abandon ship and fire
drills?
Yes, every Sunday.
Every Sunday?
Every Sunday.
Was there a prescribed time?
It altered over the years, but normally
it was about 10:00, 10:30 a.m.
So you pretty much knew when the drill
was going to come?
Yes.
Were these drills, you know, to the
best of your knowledge and recollection, were
they ever conducted at night or in bad weather
or during odd hours other than those —
Never
— time periods?
No.
Always —
Never.
Always consistent?
Always.
Thank you, sir. Did you ever receive
any type of training on how to launch the
lifeboats onboard?
Yes.
Could you, you know, kind of layout for
us what type of training you may have had?
On fire drills, when everyone would
muster at the lifeboats, one of the DPOs would
often go over different case scenarios such as
launching a life rafts or launching a
lifeboats, heat exhaustion and just different
things. And, yes, lowering the lifeboats was
one of them. And they would actually go
through how the steps to do it are, are done
and completed.
Did you actually ever load the
lifeboat?
Occasionally, yes, we would have had
the lifeboats loaded.
Did you actually every lower the
lifeboats?
Yes, the lifeboats would be lowered,
but not with any personnel in them.
And if you could estimate what
frequency did they actually lower the
lifeboats — on the number of drills you had,
what percentage of the time did they actually
lower them?
I would say about fifty percent of the
time.
Okay. Thank you, sir. Now you
mentioned previously in your testimony that
the command to abandon the rig was given.
Could you briefly outline specifically as you
could the steps of that particular evolution?
Uhhh
When the order was given to abandon
ship, what did you do?
What did I — I was already on, I was
already on the lifeboat at the time, and we
were just basically told, “Orders had been
given to abandon ship,” and so I basically
stood my position, which is right behind the
coxswain, and that was basically all I did. I
was seatbelted to the seat and it was lowered.
Now do you recall, did they take a
muster prior to entering the lifeboat?
They were trying to, but I’m not really
sure if they got an accurate muster.
Do you know —
Well, yes, I would like to elaborate on
that. It was completely chaotic, and the
person who was taking the muster at the time
was dazed and in shock that he was having
trouble finding people’s names on the list.
And that really stuck out in my mind, because
he — this was a man who’s known me for nine
years and he could not even remember my name.
And it was just completely chaotic and no one
could really — was paying attention, in my
opinion. They were more concerned about just
getting off the rig, escaping.
Now the person you indicated was
supposed to be taking the muster, based upon
your training and experience, was that the
individual who was designated to do that
function or was it somebody different?
That was him, that was his function.
Do you know what happens when an
individual doesn’t show up at muster? For
example, if you’re going to the lifeboat and
you’re trying to get a head count and
somebody’s not there, what is the typical
process?
A group is sent out to find them.
To the best of your knowledge, did that
happen on this occasion?
Yes, there were people missing.
Do you know if anybody was sent out to
try to find them?
No, I do not know.
Do you know who gives the ultimate
demand to actually launch the lifeboat?
The captain.
And do you know if that happened in
this occasion?
Yes, it did.
Do you know how many people were
assigned to your lifeboat?
No, I do not know a number.
Are you familiar with any type of
information that’s either posted on the inside
or the outside of the lifeboat concerning its
operation?
Pardon?
Are you familiar with any type of
information that may be posted in the lifeboat
concerning its actual operation?
Yes, I believe there are placards
explaining different functions on the
lifeboat.
In this particular occasion when they
launched the lifeboat, was everybody who, to
the best of your recollection, was everybody
who was at that lifeboat station able to get
on board the lifeboat?
Yes.
Again, could you briefly outline for us
some of the items that are typically found on
lifeboats, and in particular, here on the
Deepwater Horizon as far as safety gear?
Let’s see. Rafts — not rafts, but
containers for water and food, ropes, paddles.
There’s an air — a small air system to put up
a positive pressure inside the capsule to keep
smoke and fumes out. There’s a water system
that will spray over the vessel to put out any
fires or try to wash it. That’s about the
best of my recollection.
Do you know if there’s any type of
cutting devices that are included in that
safety gear?
I do not know, but I’m going to assume
yes. It seems to have just about everything
for it.
In your opinion, do you believe that it
was possible to basically have everybody
muster at your lifeboat station and board the
lifeboat within three minutes?
No.
What were some of the obstacles?
Mostly just getting everybody there in
time.
Assuming everyone was there, based upon
the drills you conducted, was there sufficient
time to load the boat within three minutes?
No. Just getting people onboard, if
they were all there, it would take longer than
three minutes in my opinion.
Thank you. If we could just shift
topics here for a minute. For fire drills,
what was your assignment?
For fire drills?
Yes, sir.
To take roll of the tech team as the
came into the ECR and then to assist as
directed.
Other than that, you did not have a
formal specified fire fighting role such as a
hoseman or anything like that?
No, I did not.
While you were onboard the Horizon, did
Transocean provide you with any type of
additional training regarding fire fighting
equipment and systems on board the vessel?
Yes. I went to a Coast Guard fire
fighting school.
And when was that, sir?
I just did it last June, in 2009.
Could you just really quickly outline
what that school covered?
It covered different types of fires,
different types of extinguishing systems,
different ways to fight the fire. It had
mock ships and engine rooms that would
actually be on fire that we would make teams
and go in and put out the fires.
Based upon your completion of that
school, did you feel competent in your
abilities to deal with fire fighting
situations?
Pretty much, yes.
And then the last topic I want to touch
upon was the safety management system. Were
you familiar with the safety management system
on board the Horizon?
Such as? Can you define that a little
more?
Oh, for example, if there was an
incident that occurred concerning some type of
a safety-related issue, were you familiar with
the processes for reporting those and who did
it go to?
The process that I basically knew of
for my position was to go to my immediate
supervisor for any type of safety issue or
concern.
And who was that, sir?
It varied while I was out there, but
Steve Bertone, who was our maintenance
supervisor, or my first engineer or the
mechanical supervisor.
Are you familiar with any of the
systems for documenting those occurrences and
how solutions are rendered?
Not really, no.
MR. WHEATLEY:
Thank you, sir. I have no further
questions at this point.
E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. DYKES:
Mr. Brown, I’m just trying to clean up
my notes here. You came on duty at twelve
p.m. that day?
Yes.
Your normal hitch is twelve p.m. to
twelve a.m.?
Yes.
Backing up to the gas alarms. The gas
alarms that you heard going off when you were
in the engine control room, those are alarm
only; correct?
Yes.
They have no shut-in capability?
No.
You mentioned that doing the pre-tour
meeting at 11:00 that day you saw a
disagreement between Transocean
representatives and the BP representative?
Yes.
Who were those individuals for
Transocean?
For Transocean? Jimmy Harrell, the
OIM; Randy Ezell, the senior toolpusher; and
Huey — no, Dewey Revette, the driller.
And who was the BP representative?
I am not familiar with his name.
MR. DYKES:
Okay. Thank you.
E X A M I N A T I O N
BY CAPT NGUYEN:
Just a couple of questions. You say
that you’ve been with the Horizon since Korea;
is that correct?
Yes.
Has the vessel ever experienced total
loss of power, electrical power?
Yes, once before, and that’s when I was
talking about the Engine Number 3 governor
that failed on us. It plunged us into a
“blackout,” as we call it.
Was that reported to Class Society or
anybody? Do you know how it was handled?
It was reported, yes, up to — I’m not
sure exactly you, but I know it turned into a
big scenario, and it was dealt with by several
different areas.
So when the Number 3 experienced the
casualty, did emergency power come on? Do you
know?
Yes, it did. The SVC system is
programmed to, in the event of a dark ship to
take over and will automatically turn on any
standby engines and activate any thrusters
that were already on line. And it did that.
Now since you’ve been with Transocean
for almost ten years; is that correct?
Eleven years.
Eleven years, what is the safety vision
for Transocean? Can you state that?
MR. GORDON:
I’m sorry?
CAPT NGUYEN:
The safety vision for Transocean.
MR. GORDON:
Safety vision?
CAPT NGUYEN:
Yes.
BY CAPT NGUYEN:
Does Transocean have a safety vision?
Vision?
Yes.
Yes, it does. And that’s basically, no
harm to environment or personnel, a job will
be done safely or will not be done until it
can be found a way to do it safely. And, yes.
And if a job — there’s a stop program.
Basically if a job or something is seen that
is not safe, the job is stopped.
So how does that vision get implemented
down to the deck plate?
How does it get implemented down to the
deck plate?
Where you’re at.
Basically, there is just that type of
scenario. If something, if something’s not
being done properly, it is stopped until it
can be found a way to do it properly. If you
see someone doing an unsafe act, you stop them
on the spot and correct them on the right way
to do it, the safe way to do it.
So for every operational evolution, the
safety is incorporated in the decision-making
every time?
Yes.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Okay, thanks.
Flag state, do you have any
questions?
MR. LINSIN:
Yes. Thank you very much, Captain.
E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. LINSIN:
Good morning, Mr. Brown. My name is
Gregory Linsin. I’m representing the Republic
of Marshall Islands, and I have a couple of
questions about your testimony this morning,
sir.
You testified at one point regarding
some changes that you recall having occurred
in the manning aboard the Deepwater Horizon;
was that correct, sir?
Yes.
And I wasn’t clear from your testimony,
were those manning changes contrasted between
the times you were in Korea and times you were
on station here in Gulf?
The manning reduction took place when
we were here in the Gulf.
And so the man — there are differences
in manning requirements for a rig like this
while it is underway and while it is on
station; is that correct?
Yes.
And do the changes that you have talked
about have anything to do with those changes
in personnel requirements for underway and on
station?
I would think it would.
In essence, more personnel are required
when a rig is underway; is that correct?
Yes.
Are you familiar with the minimum safe
manning certificates for the Deepwater
Horizon?
Somewhat, yes.
Well, have you reviewed them before
your testimony here today, sir?
No, I did not.
All right. And do you know what
authority establishes minimum safe manning
certificates for vessels, for MODUs such as
the Deepwater Horizon, or for any other
commercial vessel?
Can you explain that? Repeat that,
please?
Are you familiar —
MR. GORDON:
He has not offered testimony on
that. He’s only offered testimony on
what factually occurred in the engine
room for now and he’s not here to opine
about what Marshall Islands
requirements are, and I think this is
really outside of his testimony.
CAPT NGUYEN:
I think that’s a substantially
interstate. He has a right — Marshall
Islands has a right to ask these kind
of questions, sir.
BY MR. LINSIN:
Let me phrase the question this way,
sir. Are you aware that the Deepwater Horizon
changed flags from Panama to the Marshall
Islands in 2005?
Yes.
And are you aware, have you compared
the manning requirements for this rig as
between Panama and the Marshall Islands?
No.
Are you aware, sir, that the manning
requirements for the Deepwater Horizon while
on station increased as a result of its change
to the Marshall Islands flag?
No, I’m not aware of that.
MR. LINSIN:
Captain, in the interest of time,
what I would request is permission to
submit manning certificates to the
Board both from the Marshall Islands
and from Panama regarding the Deepwater
Horizon.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Yes. We’ll admit that into the
record and make copies for all Parties
In Interest.
MR. LINSIN:
All right.
BY MR. LINSIN:
You testified, Mr. Brown, that it was
your impression, in the confusion in the
engine room that you experienced, it was your
impression that Engine Number 3 had exploded;
is that correct?
Yes.
And did you see that explosion, or are
you just inferring that that’s what occurred?
I somewhat saw the evidence of it.
And what was that evidence, sir?
Well, the first explosion basically
came from the port side in the direction that
Number 3 engine is located at, and plus, when
we went back out on the aft lifeboat deck,
there was damage coming from the back of
Engine Room 3.
You also testified about a couple of
events that had occurred prior to the casualty
on April 20th, I believe you said in one of
the oil lube pressure switches had not been
functioning; is that correct?
Yes.
And then another situation where the
governor on Engine Number 3 had failed; is
that correct?
Yes.
Were those conditions repaired, sir?
Yes, they were.
And do you know whether or not a report
of those events, a casualty report of those
events were made to the flag state?
I do not know.
And do you know whether the flag state
monitored that situation to ensure that those
repairs were made?
I do not know.
MR. LINSIN:
Nothing further, Captain. Thank
you.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Thank you, sir.
Counsel for Mr. Brown, would you
like to question?
MR. GORDON:
Yes, one point.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Yes, sir.
MR. GORDON:
Can I do it from here?
CAPT NGUYEN:
No, sir. Get up there, please.
E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. GORDON:
Mr. Brown, I’d like to take you back to
that pre-tour meeting that took place between
you and others that were going to start that
tower and ask you if Jimmy Harrell does he
have an accent?
Yes, he does.
How does he talk?
He sort of talks in a very low
grumbling voice.
Like this kind of talk (demonstrating)?
Yes.
Okay. Do you recall him, after the
interaction between the BP person and the OIM,
do you recall Jimmy Harrell as he was walking
out saying anything?
Yes. He was —
What did he say, and how did he say it?
He pretty much grumbled in his manner
about, “Well, I guess that’s what we have
those pinchers for.”
Repeat that?
“I guess that’s what we have those
pinchers for.”
Okay. Do you know what he was
referring to, or why he would have said that?
I’m assuming he was referring to the
shear rams on the BOP.
MR. GORDON:
Okay. Thanks so much.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Thank you, sir. We have about
nineteen minutes left, and Transocean
have the next opportunity. Would you
like to take that opportunity, sir?
MR. KOHNKE:
Yes, thank you.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Yes, sir.
Is that correct? 10:45, right,
that you have to depart?
MR. GORDON:
Yes.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Yes, sir, okay.
And again, the other Parties In
Interest, if you would like Mr. Brown
to return, you know, for your
opportunity to question him, please,
you know, make the request to Commander
Jeff Bray and he will arrange for that.
E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. KOHNKE:
Just to see if I can jog a name for
you. Was the company man that was a part of
this discussion, do you recall the name Bob
Kaluza?
I’ve heard the name. I don’t know if
that’s who that was.
There was more than one BP company man
out there and they worked tours just like the
drill crew?
Yes.
Okay. Let me get to that point in time
when the crew is mustering, and there is
someone who you said has known you quite well
who didn’t know your name and you who taking
the muster, I think you said?
Yes.
I think you said he appeared to be in
shock; is that what you said?
Yes. He looked very dazed and confused
and in shock.
Who was that individual?
Patrick Morgan, the off-tour AD.
Okay. And Patrick Morgan had been, you
say, off tour, that means he was being
relieved by the guy who was on tour?
Yes.
There were a number of people, I
thought you said, that were, I thought you
said crying and some screaming?
Yes.
And some, certainly like yourself, who
were hurt?
Yes.
In fact, you mentioned Mike Williams,
he was with you and he had been hurt just like
you?
Yes.
And there were a number of other people
who were hurt?
Yes.
And there were people, there was one
injured person, I think being helped into the
lifeboat; is that correct?
Yes.
Was that on a stretcher or — was that
person on a stretcher?
I believe it was, yes.
And Patrick, did you say Patrick —
what’s his last name?
Morgan.
Patrick Morgan. Did you question him
as to whether he had been hurt?
No, I did not.
So when you say he was “in shock,” you
don’t know if it was a physical shock or the
shock of a concussive wave from the explosion,
you just don’t know?
Shock, as in shocked by the events.
And the people who were crying, do you
know who they were?
Not really.
Did the taking of muster, you said
there was a list of names?
Yes.
There were no lights, other than the
light from the flame in the derrick; isn’t
that correct?
Yes.
So it was very hard to read, if at all
possible, to read the names on that list under
those circumstances; isn’t that correct?
It could have been, but someone had a
flashlight, too.
Did Mr. Morgan have a flashlight?
I don’t believe he was holding it.
So the difficulty in conducting the
muster was the product of this extreme
situation that —
Yes.
— that you were being subjected to; is
that correct?
Yes.
And let me go back to what you said
about Jimmy Harrell when he grumbled. Where
was this meeting that you talked about where
there was a disagreement?
The pre-tour meetings are held in the
Simrad room, which is right next to the
galley.
And you were in there as part of the
pre-tour meeting, correct?
Yes.
And the discussion that was being held
between these individuals would have been a
downhole discussion, meaning it related to the
drilling operations, not to the engine room
operations, so you typically would not have
been a part of that?
Correct.
And you’ve never worked on a drill
floor, have you?
I did long, long time ago. Yes, when I
was more of a chief mechanic, I did a lot of
repairs up there.
When I say “worked on a drill floor,”
I —
As in, no. As part of the drilling
team, no.
You haven’t been part of a drill crew?
No.
Was this the first time you ever heard
the word “pincers” used in the way that you
thought it meant, some sort of a shear ram?
No, I’ve heard it referred to that way
before.
By whom?
Just different people on the rig floor.
Can you identify any of those people so
that we might ask them about it?
They were Transocean employees, but,
no, I can’t recall names.
Okay. These would have been the same
people who had worked with for the previous
eleven years?
Yes.
You can’t recall whoever said that?
Not offhand, no, ’cause some have moved
to different rigs.
Was there anyone on the rig at the time
of this explosion who you can identify as a
person who would have used the word “pincer”
to mean a shear ram, which is what you
interpreted it to mean?
MR. GORDON:
You mean other than Jimmy Harrell?
MR. KOHNKE:
Anyone.
THE WITNESS:
Anyone? I’m trying to think of his
name, but, yeah, there was an AD. I
might even use, yes, Patrick Morgan.
MR. GORDON:
I wouldn’t say — with all due
respect, counsel, he did suffer a head
injury, so he’s being treated for that.
He’s not taking that position, that his
testimony is questionable, but some of
part of his recollection is not there
right now.
MR. KOHNKE:
Does that include using the word
“pincer”?
MR. GORDON:
Unfortunately, it would.
MR. KOHNKE:
Okay. Thank you. That’s all I
have.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Okay. We’ve still got about twelve
minutes. Let’s see. Cameron?
COUNSEL REPRESENTING CAMERON, INC.:
No questions.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Thank you, sir. Halliburton?
COUNSEL REPRESENTING HALLIBURTON:
Nothing at this time.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Thank you, sir. M-I SWACO?
COUNSEL REPRESENTING M-I SWACO:
No questions.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Dril–quip?
COUNSEL REPRESENTING DRIL-QUIP, INC.:
No questions.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Weatherford?
COUNSEL REPRESENTING WEATHERFORD,
INC.:
No questions.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Anadarko?
COUNSEL REPRESENTING ANADARKO
PETROLEUM CORPORATION:
No questions.
CAPT NGUYEN:
MOEX?
COUNSEL REPRESENTING MOEX, USA:
(No response.)
CAPT NGUYEN:
Mr. Brown, you already stated. So
BP?
MR. GODFREY:
Captain, no questions at this time.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Brown, are there question that
we didn’t ask you, or any information
that you think the Board should be
aware of that you want to offer at this
time?
THE WITNESS:
I think the only thing I’d really
like to add is, I would like to see the
cause of this incident found out and
corrected so that our personnel out
there can go to work feeling safe and
be safe. That’s all I have.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Yes, sir. Thank you for your
testimony, and will you make yourself
available if the Board need for you to
appear to provide additional
information?
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
CAPT NGUYEN:
Yes, sir. Thank you very much.
You are dismissed.
